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Abstract
In the election for President of the United States, the Electoral College is the body
whose members vote to elect the President directly. Each state sends a number of
delegates equal to its total number of representatives and senators in Congress; all but
two states (Nebraska and Maine) assign electors pledged to the candidate that wins
the state's plurality vote. We investigate the eect on presidential elections if states
were to assign their electoral votes according to results in each congressional district,
and conclude that the direct popular vote and the current electoral college are both
substantially fairer compared to those alternatives where states would have divided
their electoral votes by congressional district.
1 Introduction
The upcoming election has rekindled interest in possible reform of the unique Electoral
College system used to elect the U.S. President. Under the Electoral College each state
receives an electoral vote for each member in its Congressional delegation: one for each
member in the House of Representatives and one each for its two Senators. There are a total
of 538 electoral votes and a candidate needs a majority of at least 270 electoral votes to win
the election.1 Most states allocate their electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis.
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1Although there are total of 535 members of Congress, the District of Columbia gets 3 electoral votes
under the 23rd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution even though it has no members of Congress.
1Attempts to change this arrangement within individual states are not uncommon. For
example, in California prior to the 2008 presidential election a group advanced the \Presiden-
tial Election Reform Act" [Petition 2007], a proposed referendum for the state to change the
mechanism by its electoral votes are awarded. Following the method of Maine and Nebraska,
rather than awarding all electoral votes to the winner of the plurality vote, only the two
at-large electors in the state would be determined in this way, while the remaining electors
(53) would be awarded to the winner in each of California's congressional districts. While
ultimately the referendum did not qualify for the ballot, it is interesting to ask how this
change would aect the presidential election.
What has clouded this specic initiative in controversy is the petitioner's connection to
the Republican Party.2 As California has voted for the Democratic candidate for President
in every election since 1992, the likelihood of Democratic victories in near-future presidential
elections has appeared large enough that the initiative can be viewed as a partisan eort to
remove a Democratic advantage in the short term.
What makes this more interesting is that a other states might also be a target for this kind
of electoral change. For example, a similar change was recently proposed for Pennsylvania by
various Republican politicians, most notably State Senate Majority Leader Dominic Pileggi3;
despite there being a Republican governor, and a Republican majority in both houses, the
change was ultimately not approved. Among the reasons cited for its failure was the simple
chance that the state could once again trend Republican in the near future, removing a gained
advantage; another was the simple possibility that the state would lose attention and clout
if fewer of its electoral votes were in play. Finally, there was the possibility that the change
of focus to the Congressional district level for president would similarly aect other elections
down the ticket, putting once-safe state-level seats into play again.
Recognizing that these sorts of factors would be present in many states, we wish to sys-
tematically examine how changes in the allocation of electoral votes would alter Presidential
elections. We do so by using historical elections to construct appropriate counterfactuals.
We begin by discussing several potential sources of bias in the Electoral College and den-
ing several useful measures to quantify the partisan bias in the electoral system. We then
examine the impact if California had adopted the Maine-Nebraska method, rst on California
2Petitioner Thomas W. Hiltachk, the signed author of the proposal and representative of Californians for
Equal Representation, is a partner of law rm Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, LLP, which has represented the
California Republican Party.
3See http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/change-proposed-for-states-electoral-vote-process-
314523/ and http://vethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/pennsylvania-electoral-college-plan-could-
backre-on-g-o-p/ for more background.
2itself, then on the entire presidential election process. We also examine a possible situation
with reciprocity: whether Texas, a state that has consistently favored the Republican can-
didate for President, had also apportioned its votes similarly. What is most interesting,
however, is to consider what would happen if the entire country were to allocate its electoral
vote by Congressional district.
We recognize that many factors would change under such an occurrence { for example,
rather than travel to states where the vote would be close, candidates would likely focus
their eorts to highly competitive districts, perhaps in states where the total vote is seen to
be solidly toward one candidate (see [Katz, Gelman and King 2004]). As this is a historical
evaluation of a hypothetical system, we leave the debate of future changes in campaign
strategies to others, and examine
only the direct eects on the mapping of popular to electoral votes, ignoring any vote
changes that would occur. We believe this is a reasonable rst approximation given that any
changes in strategies by the two sides should tend to cancel out and have little net eect on
relative vote shares within districts or states.
1.1 Sources of Bias in the Electoral College
The choice of the Electoral College, as opposed to other proposed schemes to elect a chief
executive, was made in 1787 at the Constitutional convention, primarily due to its two distinct
characteristics: it allowed smaller states to wield additional electoral power, allaying fears
that larger states would ignore federally signicant interests; and it permitted slave states to
add their non-free population to the total reckoning (giving each slave an electoral value of
three-fths that of a free person). While the latter of these adjustments disappeared with
the prohibition of slavery, the former remains a concern.
The makeup of the Electoral College is proportional to the total number of represen-
tatives a state has in Congress. As each state has two senators regardless of population,
smaller states have more power per capita in the Senate. This imbalance is diminished in
the Electoral College, due to the addition of counting proportionally elected representatives,
but its presence is still a potential source of asymmetry.4
Each state is free to determine how to allocate its electoral votes, and alternative schemes
4Another way to dene the inuence of states in the Electoral College is by comparing the empirical voting
power, or the probability that an individual vote is decisive, in dierent states. Voting power varies greatly
from state to state { for example, Utah is so far from the national median that voters there have almost zero
chance of determining the national electoral vote winner { but, overall, voters in small states have slightly
higher voting power; see [Gelman, King, Boscardin 1998].
3have been used at dierent times. Until 1832, several states awarded electors on the basis of
the plurality vote in each of a map of \electoral districts" drawn dierently from congressional
districts.5
Whether or not electors are not assigned on a winner-take-all basis by each state, there
is still the possibility of \wasted vote" bias, where voters for one candidate are dispropor-
tionately located in a small number of districts. (This is known as \crack and pack" gerry-
mandering when done deliberately.) If the vote were split evenly in this circumstance, the
remaining districts would lean toward the other candidate, giving them an advantage: more
of their candidate's voters would have inuence in districts where the outcome is less certain.
The implementation of the Maine-Nebraska plan would reduce this bias between states, but
expose a new one within each state instead, as votes can now be wasted by district.
Implementing the Maine-Nebraska method in each state would have an eect dependent
on the overall vote. A state whose voters are evenly split might not see a large change in
the expected number of electors { just in the variance of the outcome, since now electors
would be closer to evenly split rather than an equal chance that either candidate would win
the whole slate. And a state with high probability of voting for one candidate may see only
minor changes if only a small fraction of congressional districts would give a plurality vote
for the losing candidate. We expect that the greatest shift in votes would then be somewhere
in between { a state leaning moderately towards one candidate but with great variation in
its congressional districts.
2 Measures of Fairness: Symmetry and Partisan Bias
In elections between two dominant parties (where third-party votes may safely be disre-
garded), we consider as our most important measure the notion of electoral symmetry, as
specied in [King and Browning 1987, Gelman and King 1990]. In a two-party electoral sys-
tem, suppose one party receives a particular share of the total vote (V) and correspondingly
receives a particular share of the total electors or seats in the body (S). If instead, in the
same election, the other party had received a vote share V, then they must receive the same
share of seats S that their opponents would have received.
In essence, this denition suggests that in a symmetric system, the party labels would
have no impact on the nature of the outcome. Partisan bias, therefore, is the property of an
electoral system where symmetry is broken.
5Michigan enacted this system for the 1892 election, but removed it for the subsequent election in 1896.
4Since we can only observe one outcome of an election, this denition requires a framework
that allows us to investigate hypothetical election scenarios for previous elections.
2.1 Evaluating Elections Using a Model for District-Level Votes
As postulated in [Gelman and King 1994], we model one party's share of the two-party vote
in a district, vi, as dependent on predictor variables and two sources of error: a systematic
component, those variations that are characteristic of the system itself (in particular random
outcomes up until election day), and a random component, those variations that cannot be
attributed to the system (such as factors on election day itself). We assume that the share
of total error in each year attributed to systematic factors is constant.
All together, this suggests that one election can be modeled as
vi = X
0
i + i + "i;
where Xi is a vector of predictors with coecients , i is normal with mean 0 and variance
2, and "i is normal with mean 0 and variance (1   )2. This implies that the total
unexplained variance is 2, where  is the systematic fraction of the total vote.
The estimates of  and 2 are identical to those in a standard linear model. To estimate
, the fraction of the vote attributed to systematic factors, we model several consecutive
elections simultaneously. If two consecutive elections use the same electoral map (that is,
a redistricting has not occurred), we model the later election using the earlier election as a
predictor variable and save the coecient value. The mean of these values is our estimate
for .
To investigate symmetry and partisan bias, we must estimate the results of the election
when the mean vote is set at specied values. To accomplish this, we make the generalized
uniform partisan swing assumption: For small deviations, a shift in the mean vote can be
applied equally to each district in the system. Our simulation equation therefore takes the
form
~ vi = X
0
i +  + i + ~ "i
where ~ "i are newly simulated errors and the i are the estimated systematic errors, given the
observed vote vi. (See [Gelman and King 1994] and [JudgeIt 2008] for more information on
this process.) To calculate , the shift in the mean vote, rst calculate the observed mean
5vote (in this analysis, the average vote across all the congressional districts), then subtract
it from the desired mean vote.
With these tools, we now have the means of calculating our useful quantities, which are
functions of district votes and their results { whether individual districts and whole states
give more votes to one of each major party candidate.
2.2 Measurements of Partisan Bias
We have several methods of determining whether symmetry in a system is violated. The
choice depends on which quantity we choose to set as known. For this analysis, we x the
mean vote at 50%, and determine partisan seat bias, the dierence in the share of seats
between the two candidates' parties. If this is zero, symmetry is obeyed; if not, we have a
measure of the bonus one party gets due to the conguration of the electoral map.
Alternatively, we can determine electoral win bias by setting a shift in votes so that each
candidate has an equal chance of winning, as well as circumstances in which one candidate
has a very high probability of winning. If the mean vote required for an equal probability
of winning is far from equal for each candidate, symmetry is broken; this eect is especially
noticeable if one candidate has a very high probability of victory while obtaining less than
50% of the mean vote.
For example, Figure 1 shows the measurements of each quantity for the 2004 presidential
election between George W. Bush and John Kerry. Using generalized uniform partisan swing
we can project the election results from their observed value over a narrow range including
the 50% mark. The vertical bar at V = 0:5 represents the central 95% probability interval
for the mean expected seats; as this bar clearly contains the 50% seat point, we conclude
that the system does not have a statistically signicant partisan seat bias. Given that the
center of this interval is nearly at 0.5, our estimate of the partisan seat bias is practically
negligible.
The horizontal bar at S = 0:5 represents the probability interval for Kerry having a 50%
chance of winning the election with respect to the average vote. Since the 50% bar covers
the point where the vote is split equally, we conclude that this system does not have an
statistically signicant electoral win bias. Similarly, the center of this interval is so close to
0.5 that the magnitude of any electoral win bias is negligible.
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Figure 1: The electoral votes vs. direct vote curve for the 2004 presidential election. The
black line is the mean fraction of electoral votes as a function of average district vote; green
lines are the 95% interval for electoral votes. The red and blue bars are estimates of the
mean partisan seat bias and mean electoral vote bias with respect to a symmetric outcome
at (0.5, 0.5) . In this election, neither of these bias estimates is statistically or practically
signicant, so that we judge the 2004 Electoral College to be symmetric for the two parties.
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Figure 2: The change in electors if California had shifted to the Maine-Nebraska system in
2000 (other years are similar). Left gure: the fraction of California's electoral votes received
by Democratic candidate Al Gore. The dotted line is under winner-take-all, solid is under
the Maine-Nebraska system; the vertical line is the share of the of the direct vote actually
received by Gore in the election, over 57%. Right, the dierence between these two systems
in total electoral votes, in red. The maximum gain for Republican candidate George W.
Bush would be if Kerry's true support was 51%, resulting in a gain of roughly 28 electoral
votes; at the observed level of support for Gore, this is roughly an additional 20 electoral
votes that would have been won by Bush.
3 Evaluating California and the Country under the Maine-
Nebraska Method
Before demonstrating what would happen if all states assigned its voters by the Maine-
Nebraska method, we rst look at California alone to reveal the magnitude of the change
conditioned on the state's (hypothetical) average vote. In this case, we are looking from a
strategist's point of view: we do not know the exact mean vote of the outcome, but we do
have an estimate of the population's underlying support. This allows us to set a single value
of , though elections produced with this value will have slightly dierent mean votes from
each other (which is a consequence of the random variation in each district.)
Figure 2 indicates the consequences of this change for the 2000 election. The change
in expected electoral votes is greatest between 1 and 3 percentage points on each side of
an evenly split vote, diminishing slowly as a party's advantage increases. The maximum of
8eect is almost identical in each election year studied, suggesting that the distribution of voter
preference is quite similar over time. At the observed level of support for the Democratic
candidate over the past two decades, this corresponds to a gain of roughly 20 electoral votes
for the Republican candidate in each election.
We have suggested that since California has recently been a reliably Democratic state, it
should only adopt the Maine-Nebraska system if other large, reliably Republican states were
to follow suit, in order to balance the outcome. However, it is evident from the nonlinear
nature of the eect that the notion of \balance" would be dicult to accomplish, both
politically and mathematically. Swing states whose results pivot about 50% each year would
likely be unwilling to adopt the Maine-Nebraska system for fear of losing their inuence;
states that vote solidly for one party would have little to gain by the move for their party,
despite the increased attention in their swing districts; and states who consistently vote for
President opposite to their state legislatures are rare.
Under these conditions, the only large, single state that has voted the opposite way of
California and had state legislatures opposite to their presidential vote is Texas (before the
elections in 2002 and redistricting in 2003). We therefore measure the impact on the election
for President in past years where California alone, as well as California and Texas, would
have adopted the Maine-Nebraska system. We also consider what would happen if the entire
country decided to switch over.
3.1 Examining the Entire Country
We model the outcomes of the Electoral College for each presidential election between 1956
and 2004.6
For this analysis, we assume that the popular vote total is known exactly at each point,
though with as many congressional districts as are present in the United States (compared
to California), the dierence is negligible.
We measure both partisan seat bias and electoral win bias in four separate scenarios:
6The year 1968 is the only recent presidential contest where a major third-party candidate appears after
the fact to have made a major impact on the properties of the election. We ought to consider the impact of
shifting votes to and from George Wallace, who won ve southern states and 46 electoral votes, but we do
not have the model framework to do so; as a result, votes are only shifted between Hubert Humphrey and
Richard Nixon. Results for this year are therefore more speculative than in all others. We also note that for
Florida's electoral votes in 2000, third-party candidates Nader and Buchanan each had vote counts that were
far more than the ultimate vote dierence between candidates Bush and Gore, but far less than the eective
uncertainty of this dierence, so that their presence can be safely ignored for our purposes.
9 As they were originally held;
 California adopting the Maine-Nebraska method;
 California and Texas adopting the Maine-Nebraska method, and
 Every state in the union adopting this method.
We demonstrate the overall trend in partisan bias only, in Figure 3; those for electoral win
bias are comparable in their interpretation. Historically, neither quantity has been noticeably
dierent from zero since 1976. Before this year, three of the preceding four elections show a
strong Democratic bias, but all in blowout years { 1956, 1964, and 1972 { where one party
won the election decisively. Since the mean vote in all these cases is far from evenly split,
we must question the validity of uniform partisan swing as an assumption in these cases, as
well as in 1984, a landslide win for Ronald Reagan.
This is abundantly clear with the result in 1972, where the implementation of the Maine-
Nebraska system in California would cause the Democrats to lose a partisan bias in their
favor, despite losing California. In this year, Richard Nixon handily won the election, but
won his home state of California by a smaller margin than the nation as a whole. Since
partisan bias is measured at the point of equality, raising the mean vote to equality under
uniform partisan swing would put California in the Democratic column, meaning that Demo-
cratic candidate George McGovern would expect to lose his hypothetical advantage there.
However, the probability that the electorate in 1972 would split the vote evenly is so remote
that this hypothetical situation isn't worth seriously considering, conning us to deal with
closer elections { in particular, each election starting in 1976 with the exception of President
Reagan's blowout reelection in 1984 { so that uniform partisan swing is appropriate.
When we examine the system with California's adoption of the Maine-Nebraska method,
we see several interesting features, rst and foremost being the increasing bias towards the
Republican candidates beginning in 1984, which has a high probability of being non-zero.
Converting California would have a noticeable impact on the election; the Democratic can-
didate would need to exceed his Republican opponent by at least a full percentage point
(50.5% to 49.5%) to have an equal chance of winning the election.
As the third panel of Figure 3 shows, adjusting for the introduced partisan swing by adding
a Republican-trending state such as Texas mitigates the eect, though it is not eliminated.
Converting all states to the Maine-Nebraska method, as shown in the fourth panel, does not
make the system fairer; if anything, it entrenches a bias toward the Republicans and ensures
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Figure 3: Estimates of partisan bias in the Electoral College over 14 elections as it was,
as well as if electoral votes had been assigned by congressional district under several sce-
narios. The solid red line is the median estimate of partisan bias; dotted black lines denote
the 95% condence interval. Positive values indicate bias toward the Democratic candidate.
Top: as the system currently is, partisan bias of the electoral college is statistically indistin-
guishable from zero since 1976. Second: if California was the only additional state to adopt
elector assignment by congressional district. Third: if both California and Texas adopted
this method. Bottom: if all states adopted this method. In each case in which California's
electoral votes are divided by congressional district, there is a substantial partisan bias in
favor of the Republican candidate.
11the statistical signicance of this bias. This is because each state assigns two electoral votes to
the overall state winner in any event, and less populous states tend to vote for the Republican
candidate.
4 Conclusions: Potential Reforms and their Eects
The preceding analysis suggests that under the concept of electoral symmetry, given the
current positions of the states with respect to each other, if left untouched the Electoral
College would continue to elect a candidate fairly { that is, with negligible partisan bias.
Reforming the system by allocating electors on a per-district basis, while retaining the two
at-large electoral votes in each state, would only reduce between-state wasted-vote bias. As
long as the states retain their relative positions in terms of partisan support, the at-large
elector bias remains, which has remained steadily Republican for at least the past twenty
years and ve presidential elections.
One mechanism for enacting this method, without aecting the overall result, has been
proposed by [Lane 2008]. If a number of states have outcomes are highly likely to be for one
candidate or the other, and the total number of electoral votes for each candidate is equal,
then it would favor those states to adopt the congressional-district electoral assignment mech-
anism for the sake of creating \interesting" races; that is, candidates would now be inclined
to visit districts within states that would otherwise have been ignored in the national race.
Indeed, then-Senator Obama's victory of Nebraska's second congressional district's elector
in 2008, compared with Senator McCain's victory in all others including the statewide race,
drew considerable media attention to what otherwise would have been unremarkable. This
would of course introduce its own issues to contend with; for example, the gerrymander-
ing of congressional districts in states with this mechanism in place would be additionally
complicated by the new eect on the Presidential campaign [Thomas 2008].
This also reinforces the notion in our analyses that we are considering the fairness of
the electoral system to the candidates from each party, not the fairness of the system to an
individual voter. Voters in states that strongly favor one candidate might have plenty to
gain by changing to a district-based method, if their districts are suitably competitive, just
as voters in competitive states might have far less impact if they live in an uncompetitive
district and this change were made. The concern of the power an individual voter has to
change an electoral result, and how this power varies across the country, is the subject of
future investigations.
12Other proposals to neutralize the impact of the Electoral College involve the assignment
of electors in each state to the national popular vote, to be introduced when a combination of
states casting a majority of electoral votes adopt this plan in their legislatures. This approach
is more likely to succeed across the country than individual implementations of the Maine-
Nebraska plan partly because of its simplicity { whoever has the most votes countrywide
wins { and also because the system won't destabilize with the addition of one new state at
a time, unlike the piecewise adjustments under the adoption of the Maine-Nebraska system.
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